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Abstract
This paper analyses the characteristics of transfer pricing systems across countries, in
order to identify the grouping structures intrinsically related with rules’ similarities, and to
explore the key characteristics revealed by each group. Applying hierarchical agglomerative
technique for comparison of an extensive set of attributes from domestic transfer pricing
regulations, we find substantial differences among transfer pricing rules thus to support the
segregation of three major groups of countries. The variance across transfer pricing systems
refers not only to formal tax provisions, but also to practical requirements and regular ac-
tions from authorities, and to governments’ openness for discussion of unclear tax positions.
Although most regulations follow the main guidelines established by OECD, additional uni-
lateral mechanisms remain, suggesting that countries face distinct profit shifting occurrences
and need to create specific measures in attempt to restrain it. It thus implies the existence
of gaps in current transfer pricing guidelines, and reinforces the call for new anti-shifting
mechanisms to cover a broader set of shifting arrangements.
Keywords: profit shifting, transfer pricing systems, BEPS.
JEL Classification: F23, H26, K34
1 Introduction
The international profit shifting issue has received increasing attention in recent years from
major economies worldwide, since the escalation of a relevant body of evidences indicating that
multinational enterprises (MNE) have the ability to transfer taxable profits from high-tax to
low-tax locations in order to reduce their global tax burden. Among several profit shifting
strategies, international policy organizations highlight that the manipulation of transfer prices
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(TP) on intra-firm transactions may be the most influential one. The current criteria widely
accepted for valuation of intra-firm transactions is based on TP guidelines by Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010), which determines the arm’s length
principle as the fundamental parameter for the appropriateness of TP.
Existing studies raise striking evidences of profit shifting by means of direct TP manipu-
lation (Davies, Martin, Parenti, & Toubal, 2015; Cristea & Nguyen, 2014; Bernard, Jensen, &
Schott, 2006; Overesch, 2006; Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Swenson, 2001),
and while the imposition of special TP rules have demonstrated positive effects against tax-
reducing intra-firm transfers (Beuselinck, Deloof, & Vanstraelen, 2014; Saunders-Scott, 2013),
MNE still manage to find weaknesses and gaps on tax regulations in order to achieve it (Beer
& Loeprick, 2015). On this issue, OECD have focused substantial efforts towards the review of
current TP guidelines, thus to mitigate breaches in the framework and to widen its scope for
inclusion of contemporary unprecedented arrangements, as well as to promote OECD guidelines
as an harmonizing TP standard worldwide1. The consensus for homogeneity of TP systems
across countries is highly desirable, since the interaction of distinct domestic tax systems may
create overlaps which can result in multiple taxation of the same tax base. On the other hand,
parallel TP rules may also provide tax-avoidance opportunities, e.g. when a certain transaction
receives privileged treatment in a specific country; in this case, MNE have higher incentives to
manipulate TP in order to allocate most profits to this favourable location.
Despite an early development of general TP guidances by OECD2 and its broad accep-
tance by several world economies, countries have historically established unilateral measures to
control TP manipulation. In general, diversity in countries’ tax structures are due to differences
in economic and political contexts, and the relationship between costs of administration and
cost of compliance tends to affect the choice of tax instruments (Alt, 1983). In the TP case,
countries typically introduce the core of OECD guidelines into their domestic tax systems, and
include suitable modifications fitting their specific fiscal background. The extent of these modi-
fications vary across countries, and it may affect the methods accepted to support arm’s length
comparables and the tax-adjustment procedures implemented by tax authorities (Zinn, Riedel,
& Spengel, 2014).
Notable efforts have been long taken with aims to coordinate nations’ domestic TP rules
while maintaining their tax sovereignty, and recent discussions among tax administrations demon-
strate a substantial advance on reciprocal commitments to this objective. OECD advocates for
the application of a single TP standard worldwide3 and emphasises the need for improvement
of the existing guidelines, thus to resolve loopholes, frictions and conflicts in the interactions
of countries’ regulations (OECD, 2013). For this objective, it becomes necessary to identify
1OECD published in 2013 a major Action Plan (OECD, 2013) addressing 15 actions to be necessarily addressed
in order to resolve dominant base erosion and profit shifting issues, including changes in current TP guidelines.
At end of 2015, OECD concluded a package with specific reports on all 15 actions, which is under combined
discussion by more than 60 countries, including OECD and G20 members.
2Preceding works by OECD originated the memorable 1979 Report for Transfer Pricing and Multinational
Activity. Continuous developments produced the current international standards in the 2010 Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations.
3OECD sustains that the elimination of double taxation is most appropriately achieved through an agreed set
of international rules that are clear and predictable, giving certainty for both MNE and governments.
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the main characteristics responsible for the mismatches on TP systems across countries. The
mapping of country-specific TP attributes and the balance of these attributes into uniformities
vs. disparities enables a detailed comparison that reveals interactional tax gaps, whilst it can
expose the degree of differences carried by each country with respect to the parameter for ideal
TP standardization.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the characteristics several TP systems in order
to identify similarities across countries’ rules, thus enabling the creation of groups of countries
based on shared regulatory patterns. We focus on observable TP rules in 44 countries for the
year 2014, which are descriptively available in Transfer Pricing Guidelines prepared by interna-
tionally high-reputed audit and tax advisory firms. Based on countries’ TP rules, we create 54
variables representing relevant quantitative and qualitative attributes, which are employed for
the construction of a dissimilarity coefficient that displays the differences on TP rules between
pairs of countries. The pairwise dissimilarity measures are applied for comparative analysis
across overall TP systems via hierarchical agglomerative technique. This method allows the
unification of countries with most similar traits into separate clusters, and we follow this segre-
gation to explore the characteristics of each group.
Our results indicate the existence of three groups with relevant distinguishable attributes.
One group is composed by Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, and displays a rigid set of TP systems,
with methods and requirements that are stated explicitly through regulatory provisions. It car-
ries a close relation with domestic tax structures in each country, thus becoming comparatively
salient from general OECD guidelines. The second group is composed by Finland, Hungary,
Norway, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Russia, and also imposes a rather inflexible TP assess-
ment by tax authorities, in special with respect to the availability of tax-adjustments agreements
between government and MNE. These countries follow the basis of OECD guidelines regarding
TP methods, however domestic tax rules demand special treatment for deductibility of certain
transactions. The third group comprises the remaining 35 countries and reflects the general
TP standards implemented by OECD. Although it shows that most of countries present sub-
stantially similar TP systems, closer inspection indicates inner-level differences thus to support
the subdivision of six subgroups within this larger cluster. We observe that overall TP systems
bear high level of similarities and the overall merging structures may be sensitive to changes in
specific rules, hence the existence of separate groups rely on particular TP characteristics.
This paper provides two major contributions for the profit shifting literature. First, it
provides a novel classification of TP systems that is supported by a more comprehensive set of
characteristics, thus acquiring fair relevance within contemporary academic discussions. It adds
to a branch of selected studies devoted to the analysis of TP systems4, with findings obtained
from a more thorough approach, since we consider a wide compendium of attributes that are
highly important to the way anti-shifting mechanisms operate5, which were not explored by
4Our findings parallel in special with the widely applied categorisation created by Zinn et al. (2014) – they
propose a six-level ordered categorisation of countries that is assumed to capture the strictness of TP rules, and
it is based on two criteria: the existence of anti-shifting rule, and the extent of documentation and disclosure
requirements.
5Countries display notable variations on domestic practices regarding TP assessment. For example, the alter-
native of mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is not homogeneously effective in all countries, yet it represents a
3
previous studies, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, our analysis differs from the dominant
approach on this subject since it focuses in revealing the taxonomical arrangements of TP
systems, rather than creating an enforcement rating for countries. We aim to obtain an overview
of the variety of TP regulation styles and to observe the extent to which these styles become close
to each other. This approach has the advantage to prioritise TP characteristics as the essentials
of comparative examinations, and prevents from (deliberately) assigning an enforcement degree
to each TP system based on rules’ presumed impacts6.
Second, our results provide new knowledge about the key differences on TP systems across
countries, therefore contributing to a major review of current anti-shifting mechanisms, as pro-
posed by OECD. The present analysis explores the main attributes responsible for the distinction
of separate groups of countries, thus to display the assorted set of actions conducted by countries
in order to restrain TP manipulation. We observe that governments implement diverse measures
to mitigate profit shifting, and despite an increasing coordination among countries towards the
consistency among domestic TP rules, some of these measures still do not take into account the
effect of other countries’ regulations7. Hence, this analysis is potentially useful for the identifi-
cation of inconsistencies across countries’ TP rules, so to delineate a fair path for the review of
current TP guidelines, in order to resolve existing country-vs-country mismatches, to eliminate
TP regulatory gaps, and to devise new anti-shifting mechanisms with suitable application for
most number of countries.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data set and
the design of comparative strategy; Section 3 presents the comparative analysis and explores
the TP characteristics according to the agglomerative outcomes; and Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Investigation Strategy
The characteristics of TP systems in each country are obtained from Transfer Pricing Guidelines
published by the major audit and tax advisory firms8 for the year 2014. These Guidelines are
updated on a yearly basis and provide information on technical issues and specific aspects of
TP rules for several jurisdictions9. We adopted a similar sample used by Zinn et al. (2014) as
the categorization of TP regulations proposed by the authors have become a main reference on
critical method for resolving TP disputes (OECD, 2010). The openness of governments for mutual agreements
generate meaningful implications even on theoretical level. See Becker and Davies (2014) for a dedicated model
on TP manipulation incorporating the MAP case.
6We understand that the tax enforcement refers not only to the existence of a certain tax rule, but it depends
on other factors related to the way each country ensures that taxpayers comply with this rule. A number
of studies suggests that a tax rule produces diverse effects on distinct countries, thus governments implement
different mechanisms depending on its country-specific impact on tax compliance. See, e.g. Alm (2012) for exam
on compliance effects of tax audits and regulations, and Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger (2011) for
analysis of factors influencing enforced vs. voluntary tax conformity.
7For example, this case is likely to occur for TP systems with no tradition in MAP approach, as identified in
Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador.
8Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
9The Guidelines are widely applied on TP research, for evaluation of the influence of tax enforcement on profit
shifting, e.g. Beer and Loeprick (2015), Beuselinck et al. (2014), Zinn et al. (2014), Saunders-Scott (2013), and
Mescall (2009).
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the issue.
From data collection, we observe prominent differences on TP regulations across countries.
Notably, we find essential differences regarding the scope of related-party relationship, accepted
pricing methods and priority of methods, restrictions to internal services and cost-sharing ar-
rangements, type and extent of documentation requirement, transfer-pricing specific returns,
special penalties, and availability of advanced pricing agreement (APA) and competent author-
ity (CA) processes. We include both qualitative and quantitative attributes of TP systems in
our analysis.
For our investigation, it is necessary to outline a procedure for the comparison of these
characteristics. In our specific case, we are interested in identifying similarities across TP sys-
tems, so countries sharing most of characteristics can be assembled into a single group. At the
same time, we need to remark differences in each regulation, for groups composed by countries
with distinct TP systems can become dissociated. Since TP rules commonly represent a nar-
row and highly specialized component of a broader country-level tax system, we expect to find
high level of similarities and little overall variance across all countries, thus the separation of
TP systems is likely to rely on particular characteristics, and tends to generate groups located
substantially close to each other.
In this line, we apply hierarchical clustering via agglomerative approach, which provides
an analytical comparison of similarities for all countries, and is suitable for comparisons when
the number of groups is not previously observable. After clustering process, we analyse the TP
systems in each outlined group, with aims to identify the characteristics to support the merging
of similar countries.
The clustering strategy follows the conventional process, which is divided in two stages.
First, we calculate a measure of dissimilarity10 across countries, based on a set of variables de-
noting the characteristics of TP systems. Dissimilarities across TP systems are structured in
a n × n matrix of pairwise dissimilarities D ≡ (gij), i 6= j, where gij denotes the dissimilarity
between i-th and j-th countries. In the second stage, we use these dissimilarities to create clus-
ters of countries, applying an agglomerative method compatible with the dissimilarity measure.
Conventional agglomerative process consists on initial n clusters, for each cluster includes a
single country. The most similar pair of clusters is first unified, so to provide a new cluster with
two countries. This new cluster is then compared with the remaining n− 2 clusters, in order to
combine with the next most similar cluster. Agglomerative process repeats continuously to the
last stage, resulting on final-level group composed by all countries11.
Following this strategy, at the first stage we create a codification that generates 54 variables
related to several characteristics of TP systems. Most of characteristics are qualitative, for
which we set a binary codification stating the value 1 if the TP regulation carries the respective
attribute. For the quantitative characteristics, variables refer to corresponding standardized
measures. Description of codification for all 54 variables in Appendix.
10Simple transformation: dissimilarity = 1 − similarity (Gordon, 1987).
11There are several agglomerative methods with distinct similarity criteria for comparison of two clusters. See
Gordon (1987) for a description of traditional agglomerative methods.
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We obtain the matrix of dissimilarities across countries via Gower (1971) coefficient12, all
variables assuming the same weight, which gives a proportion of the difference between pairwise
shared characteristics between i-th and j-th countries, with respect to total characteristics. The
coefficient ranges from 0 (complete dissimilarity) to 1 (complete similarity). In this study, binary
codification of qualitative characteristics is addressed to create relevant variables for which the
absence of a characteristic (value 0) is indeed informative. Gower (1971) coefficient is consistent
with this purpose, for a cross-tabulate binary variable kij(0, 0) between two observations is
regarded as providing similarity between i-th and j-th countries.
At the second stage, we analyse the dissimilarity matrix to create clusters of countries.
We apply two related agglomerative approaches, in order to compare the nested subsets of
each classification. One method is the average linkage method across clusters13, to account for
average similarity of pairs of countries, controlling for the size of each group. The other method
is the weighted average linkage method, which is similar to the unweighted average approach
but is measured via simple average of pairwise dissimilarities14. In both methods, clusters
are combined through process of ordered pairwise similarities. Average linkage method is best
appropriate for the purpose of the present analysis since it merges groups with small variances
within TP systems, and it avoids the consolidation of two groups based on the characteristics
of a single country (Sokal & Michener, 1958). Besides, it is suitable to our case, since it is not
possible to predefine specific weights for our variables. Results obtained from agglomerative
analysis allow us to explore the characteristics of TP systems in each group, thus identifying
prominent TP characteristics within clusters, while revealing particularities and distinctive TP
patterns.
12Gower (1971) coefficient is a similarity measure for mixed variables that takes the form
sij =
∑p
k=1 δijkdijk∑p
k=1 δijk
Similarity sij is a weighted mean of the contribution of each k-th variable for the similarity between observations
i and j. The weight δijk is a binary code with value 0 if the k-th variable is missing for either i or j; otherwise,
δijk=1. If variable k is binary, the contribution dijk takes the value 0 if the variable is equal for both observations,
and takes the value 1 otherwise (this is the same as the traditional simple matching coefficient; see Gordon (1987)
for detail). If variable k is continuous, dijk is the absolute difference between i and j, standardised by the total
range of k.
13This method is also called unweighted pair-group method using average - UPGMA. Formally, UPGMA dis-
similarity gJK between two clusters J and K is
gJK =
1
nJ + nK
nJ∑
i=1
nK∑
j=1
gij
where nJ and nK are the number of countries in clusters J and K, respectively.
14This method is also called weighted pair-group method using average - WPGMA. Formally, WPGMA dis-
similarity gJK between two clusters J and K is
gJK =
1
2
nJ∑
i=1
nK∑
j=1
gij
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3 Analysis
We first present the comparative analysis of TP systems, focusing on shared characteristics for
the arrangement of groups of countries. Subsequently, we describe the leading characteristics in
each group, which are responsible for the clustering patterns.
3.1 Agglomerative Analysis
Analysis following our baseline strategy is presented in Figures 1 and 2. It is relevant to compare
the outcomes of these two approaches, since a consistent result may reveal the inner structure
of observations (Gordon, 1987). Clustering dendrograms for the average and the weighted
approaches are presented in Panel A of both Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
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Figure 1: Clustering of TP Systems - Unweighted Average Linkage
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Figure 2: Clustering of TP Systems - Weighted Average Linkage
We initially observe that both classifications generate similar local nodes corresponding to
subsets of countries, however the merging of groups at higher stages follow different arrange-
ments. At ≈0.3 level, all countries are incorporated into their respective subgroups. Internal
nodes raise the segregation of eight comparable subgroups with matching compositions between
both plots15, which are outlined in red dashed frames. The agglomerative coefficients of 0.5335
and 0.5497 for average and weighted approaches, respectively, indicate high similarity among
overall TP systems, thus the delimitations of red dashed subgroups are sensitive to specific
characteristics of TP rules.
15In detail, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Thailand have unstable approximations when we compare
both agglomeration processes. We find a ninth pattern at far right of Panel A in Figure 2, displayed in gray
dashed frame.
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At >0.4 dissimilarity levels, we find taller branches and stronger grouping structures, which
are outlined in blue dotdashed frames. They suggest that TP systems in Argentina, Brazil and
Ecuador share similar attributes, and these rules are substantially different from all remaining
countries. In addition, group composed by Finland, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Slovak Republic
and Russia emerges with significant distance from other bordering subgroups. This outcome is
more noticeable in the weighted approach16.
Stages of clustering process are presented in Panel B of Figures 1 and 2, which demonstrates
that countries become unified at a fast pace, specially within the range from 0.102 to 0.285 of the
dissimilarity level. It reflects homogeneous proximity of countries to generate their respective
subgroups. Panel C of Figures 1 and 2 presents the cross-analysis between observed dissimilari-
ties and the distances calculated during the clustering process – known as cophenetic distances.
Arrangements formed up to the level 0.3 bear rich variance due to high degree of in-between
uniformity of pairwise distances. Thus, boundaries of subgroups formed to this level (red dashed
frames on dendrograms) are not well-defined. On the other hand, cophenetic distances indicate
a good fit of clustering process at >0.4 dissimilarity levels.
The extent of the differences across all TP systems can be further inspected via multidi-
mensional scaling of pairwise dissimilarities. Figure 3 presents the two-dimension scaling for
dissimilarities across all countries.
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Dimension 1
D
im
en
si
on
 2
AR
AU
AT BE
BR
CA
CL
CN
CO
CZ
DK
EC
FI
FR
DE
GRHU
IN
ID
IE
IT
JP
LU
MY
MX
NL
NO
PE
PH
PL
PT
RO
RU
SK SI
ES
SECH
TH
UA
UK
US
VEVN
Figure 3: Two-Dimension Scaling for Dissimilarities of TP Systems
16Since the unweighted average linkage method normalises clustering distances with respect to the size of
clusters, particular patterns may become latent if clusters have homogeneous number of observations.
9
In Figure 3, the segregation of TP systems into particular clusters is not plain, since
graphical distances have uniform dispersion17. Based on agglomerative process, we simulate in
Figure 3 the linkages of eight intermediary subgroups by means of three layers crosswise the
plot18. For ease of visualisation, we set a first layer in solid line, second layer in gray line, and
third layer in dashed line.
The overlap of subgroup linkages in Figure 3 exhibits the closeness among most TP systems.
Graphical inspection suggests the split of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador into a group (farther
right side on the plot), consistent with previous plots. In addition, subgroup composed by
Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom set a sparsely distant pattern (left-
bottom diagonal quadrant in the plot), however it remains substantially close to other subgroups,
in special through approximation of Germany.
In general, results indicate that all countries display high level of similarities among each
other, and the segregation of subgroups of countries rely on particular characteristics of TP
systems. It suggests that short changes in TP rules might cause countries to switch places
from one subset to another, thus the composition of uniformly consistent clusters is unstable.
Nonetheless, closer review suggests the existence of a group composed by Argentina, Brazil
and Ecuador, which becomes reasonably distinguished from other countries. Analysis also calls
detailed attention to the conjoint movement of Finland, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Slovak
Republic and Russia, thus to indicate a possible grouping pattern for these countries. Other
remaining countries agglomerate into a condensed structure and establish a third large cluster,
where the majority of observations are divided into adjacent subgroups with sensitive boundaries.
We follow these outcomes in order to explore the characteristics of TP systems within each group,
with aims to identify leading attributes shared by its components.
3.2 Characteristics of TP Systems
Based on analysis in Subsection 3.1, we proceed with segregations in two levels: the first one
regards the arrangement of all 44 countries into three primary groups, representing agglomerative
patterns at >0.4 dissimilarity levels; the second level focuses on intermediary subdivisions at
≈0.3 dissimilarity, thus it segregates components of the larger primary cluster into six subgroups.
3.2.1 Primary Groups
Group I - Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador: These countries display the most distinguished TP
characteristics when compared with all remaining observations. TP system in these countries is
incorporated into their respective domestic law and carries some specific provisions which are
not completely consistent with OECD guidelines. In particular, Argentina and Brazil determine
17In undisclosed analysis, we apply additional dimensional-scaling tests (classical and non-metrical) with sup-
plementary dimensions, and we obtain the same material observations. The results indicate high consistency
across all TP systems.
18Based on dendrogram comparisons, we let Germany and Thailand hold single positions, while Luxembourg
pairs with Switzerland.
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specific pricing calculations each, which bear significant differences from traditional transaction
and profit-based methods19, and all three countries set arbitrary rules regarding the priority
order for application of TP methods. Besides, the override of domestic TP rules on top of
OECD principles is made explicit within their national legislation.
In this group, tax-purposed assessment of TP practices is inflexible and strictly based on
statutory provisions. Interpretation and application of TP rules tends to be acutely limited,
and APA are not available. Although Argentina and Ecuador maintain formal rules for CA
procedures20, extensive documentation requirements and extreme stringency on tax diligences
cause double-tax relief to be hardly achieved and to be rarely seek by taxpayers, thus CA process
is virtually non-existent. Lastly, we observe that internal services and cost sharing arrangements
are broadly allowed, yet domestic rules demand mandatory withholding tax on all payments to
foreign related parties, with rates ranging from 15% in Brazil to 35% in Argentina21.
Group II - Finland, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Russia: TP systems
in this group are consistent with the core of international TP principles within OECD guide-
lines. In detailed account, however, certain transactions receive a particular treatment, and the
implementation of monitoring activities and structured disclosure requirements appears to be
in current ongoing development. First, we observe that all countries allow payments to foreign
related parties, for which the general TP rules apply. These payments may include management
fees and intra-firm costs, and domestic rules require proper documentation to support the eco-
nomic essentials of these arrangements. For ordinal internal transactions, none of the countries
levy withholding taxes22. In countries where reimbursements of intra-firm costs are not allowed
due to absence of official regulation (e.g. Russia and Slovenia), firms usually sign corporate
intra-firm contracts for provision of internal services. Effectiveness of these internal contracts
are commonly unclear to tax authorities.
Statutory requirements on TP documentation were implemented in recent years, despite a
long-standing TP law by some of these countries23. TP regulations require an annual tax return
to be filled in country-specific tax forms, which consists on a short disclosure of elementary
information about intra-firm transactions. On the other hand, full TP documentation and cal-
culations, including detailed TP study, must be provided to tax authorities upon request, within
a short deadline (e.g. 3 days in Hungary and 15 days in Slovak Republic). We also observe that
these countries do not establish specific statute of limitations when intentional non-compliance
is identified – most of countries already establish a statute of limitations of 10 years for all
19Argentina has a ”commodity-based” method, in addition to conventional OECD methods, required for trans-
actions based on publicly quoted prices, and its application follow specific rules regarding agency representatives,
intermediate parties and the date of transactions. Brazil does not follow OECD methods, but determines specific
TP calculations that are based on fixed margins arbitrarily set in domestic law. Tax specialists usually regard
Brazilian TP methods as not complying with the arm’s length principle.
20CA process is not available in Brazil.
21Specific (usually reduced) withholding tax rates are applied for payments to foreign countries with bilateral
tax treaties.
22Exceptions apply, e.g. in Finland, tax rule requires a corporate withholding tax from 15% to 20% on specific
transfers, depending on the type of income.
23Hungary implemented a TP system into their domestic law in 1992, closely followed by Slovak Republic
in 1993, while both Norway and Russia imposed their domestic TP regulations in 1999. However, statutory
requirements on TP documentation were later implemented in years 2010, 2009, 2007 and 2007, respectively.
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circumstances. Moreover, this group resembles previous Group I with respect to application of
CA procedures, since both groups do not have tradition in mutual agreement procedures (MAP)
or APA. Approaches focusing on mutual agreements between tax authorities and taxpayers are
relatively new in these countries, and firms are still discouraged from submitting tax adjust-
ments or from appealing to tax arbitration courts due to limited implications obtained in recent
settlements. Thus, firms tend to contact competent authority only after a tax inspection, and
double taxation is not likely to be avoided.
Group III: The third primary group includes the remaining countries that are not included
in Group I and Group II. These TP systems are highly reflective of the internationally dissem-
inated TP standards. All countries follow OECD guidelines with respect to TP methods and
their application. In addition, most of countries have APA or APA-like programs available, and
hold formal procedures for agreements with competent authority focusing to resolve double-
taxation issues. Although these attributes support a fairly stronger clustering structure, exam
of details within individual TP systems reveals that there is no absolute uniformity among all
countries. Besides similar TP characteristics, it follows from analysis in Subsection 3.1 that a
substantial homogeneity of distances across observations is also responsible for the clustering
outcomes. Hence, we divide the components of Group III into six subgroups in order to analyse
the specific properties shared by their components.
3.2.2 Subdivision of Countries from Group III
Subgroup I - Australia, Canada, Indonesia and Japan: These countries hold an established set
of TP rules that emerge from a reliable mature development of domestic TP legislation through
the years. Tax authorities follow the guidances of OECD principles and explicitly assume the
best-for-transaction approach for the choice of TP method. TP rules carry specific provisions
on cost-sharing arrangements, and APA rules allow the rollback of an agreed TP method back
to two years from the settlement. TP rules also require the disclosure of detailed TP study in
a yearly-filed tax return, containing relevant information that includes the volume of intra-firm
transactions, location of related parties, types of transactions, and calculations of TP methods
for the tax period.
Subgroup II - Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom: This subgroup
displays more flexibility on the application of TP rules, and appears to exercise a less stringent
fiscal escort on regular circumstances. Countries follow the general OECD guidelines and are
inclined to accept the net profit set-off of conjoint transactions for TP assessment purposes,
when appropriate. With the exception of United Kingdom, the related-party condition is not
determined by statutory percentage/threshold, but it is based on the analysis of evidences for a
de facto relationship. Tax rules do not impose withholding taxes on foreign payments to related
parties, and there is no requirement for filing TP return, although a TP study and proper
documentation must be provided if requested by tax authorities.
Subgroup III - Chile, Czech Republic, Greece, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Venezuela and
Vietnam: Different from other subgroups, these countries hold a weaker tradition on agreement
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schemes between tax authority and taxpayer, since tax rules do not implement formal CA
procedures to undertake double-taxation cases, while APA rules are relatively recent for most
of these countries24. CA processes are available only in Czech Republic and Greece, yet the
chances to resolve double taxation on these countries are considered low. Tax rules carry specific
provisions on statutes of limitations for intentional non-compliance, in which cases most of
countries set a 10-years term for fiscal inspections, and most countries apply a weighty penalty
on improper TP documentation, which is calculated in proportion to the tax adjustment.
Subgroup IV - China, Colombia, Malaysia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain: In
this subgroup, tax authorities are reputably rigorous with respect to pricing appropriateness of
intra-firm transactions. TP systems allow firms to submit tax adjustments via CA procedure,
however adjustment proposals are accepted only after a fiscal inspection is completed. In most
of these countries, issuance of CA process does not suspend tax exaction, thus firms still have to
liquidate their tax liability. This requirement makes CA procedure highly inefficient, and relief of
double taxation is unlikely to occur in most of cases. With the exception of Malaysia, all countries
carry tax provisions with explicit reference to tax-treatment of permanent establishments (PE),
and most countries apply TP rules on these transactions. TP regulations also have specific
deadlines for disclosure of full TP documentation when requested, which are substantially short
when compared with the general deadline pattern of 30 days, e.g. shortest deadlines are found
in Poland (7-8 days), Spain (9 days), Portugal (10 days) and Colombia (15 days).
Subgroup V - Denmark, France, India and United States: These TP systems incorporate
a mix of characteristics that are included in previous four subgroups. Countries follow the
essentials of OECD guidelines with respect to TP methods and express preference for application
of the TP method that better reflects the nature of the transactions. Besides, tax authorities are
leaning to allow the intentional set-off approach for TP assessment, when appropriate. In the
general case, tax rules do not levy withholding taxes on payments to foreign parties, however
all countries implement specific provisions regarding the deductibility of management fees and
reimbursement of head-office expenses. In addition, countries require only a plain disclosure of
intra-firm transactions via tax return filed on yearly basis, and this requirement is conditioned
to firms complying with particular conditions established in tax regulation. On the other hand,
qualified documentation must be provided to fiscal authorities upon request, and TP rules set
specific penalizations if firms fail to properly support their TP choices, amounted as a significant
portion of the undue tax reduction.
Subgroup VI - Italy, Mexico and Ukraine: The sixth subgroup is composed by TP systems
that appear to hold a closer connection with their respective national regulatory structure.
Despite being expressly grounded on the prescribed procedures within OECD guidelines, these
TP rules display variation in some degree – in case of conflicting rules, domestic provisions
overrides OECD guidances. Among relevant attributes, all countries determine specific rules for
application of TP assessment on transactions with parties located in tax havens, and assume
a rather wide set of conditions for classification of a foreign firm as a related party. Moreover,
24In general, APA programs are still in development and specific regulation are yet to be issued by fiscal
authorities. Czech Republic is the exception here, since Czech tax rules carry clear guidelines for APA request
by taxpayers, and experience indicate that the assessment process is reasonably successful.
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these TP systems impose the priority of the CUP method regardless the type of transactions;
if CUP is unavailable, firms must prioritise the other traditional transactional-based methods.
Cost contribution arrangements are hardly accepted, specially in Mexico and Ukraine, and
general corporate practice indicate that firms rarely initiate a tax-adjustment proposal to tax
authorities, although all countries carry formal rules on CA procedures.
The special cases of Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Thailand: These countries
present unstable clustering outcomes and do not stick with specific groups. We observe that
Germany is particularly close to Subgroup II and could be allocated into this subgroup with little
prejudice, though it carries a more senior tradition on TP regulation25, with a well-consolidated
CA process and inclination for traditional transaction-based comparables. For Luxembourg,
Switzerland and Thailand, there are no structured set of TP rules on domestic tax system
– these countries claim to adopt the OECD guidelines in fullness26. Nonetheless, expertise
with respect to these countries suggests that fiscal activity on the assessment of intra-firm
transactions appears to be more lenient than in other countries, thus the effectiveness of anti-
shifting procedures is presumptively weakened.
4 Concluding Comments
The increasing relevance of TP manipulation as an efficient mean to reduce MNE’s global tax
burden has concerned governments and international policy organizations worldwide, since it
causes the reduction of national tax revenues and the increase of administration costs in order
to ensure tax compliance. This issue receives special attention after an increasing number of
current researches presents substantial evidences that profit shifting transactions cause a large
amounts of taxable profits to be allocated to jurisdictions with little-to-none economic activity.
In order to restrain tax-induced profit shifting, countries have long implemented special tax
rules to determine the appropriateness of TP, and OECD assumes the leading role in developing
the international TP standards and promoting them across countries. The current efforts are
directed to eliminate existing flaws, to devise new anti-shifting mechanisms regarding modern
arrangements, and to harmonise TP systems worldwide.
This paper analyses several TP systems in order to identify similarities among countries,
thus to create groups of countries based on uniformity of TP characteristics. We find three
major groups of countries displaying substantial differences. The first group is composed by
few countries and carry highly distinct TP rules in comparison with OECD TP guidelines. It
assumes a strict conduct with respect to dispositions in tax regulation, with no availability for
interpretations or tax-adjustment submissions. The second group have more countries than the
first group and implements TP rules consistent with the core of OECD guidelines, although it
25Germany implemented the Principles for the Examination of Income Allocation in the Case of Internationally
Related Enterprises in February of 1983.
26In Luxembourg, there are infra-law tax orientations applicable to financial activities involving related parties,
while in Thailand domestic tax law carries only a general requirement for application of arm’s length principle
on intra-firm transactions. In general, tax specialists do not regard these requirements as a structured set of TP
rules.
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also do not have tradition in agreement procedures between taxpayers and fiscal authorities, and
it exhibits tax monitoring procedures to be still in development. The third group comprises the
majority of countries and takes OECD guidelines as the fundamental TP standard, with small
variations referring to specific provisions in each country. Detailed analysis allows the separation
of concentrated subgroups, according to specialised sets of TP characteristics.
We observe that overall TP systems present high level of general similarity, nonetheless
the existing variance indicate that there is no complete homogeneity across countries. In the
general case, TP regulations are incorporated into the domestic tax system and get appended
with specific country-level rules, thus these rules are likely to carry close association with the
inner structures of the taxation process and the broader legal system in each country. Hence,
our results might point to countries’ preferences on different anti-shifting instruments, and it
may direct to relevant country factors that influence TP regulation. The present analysis thus
have application on new investigations not only regarding profit shifting and tax avoidance
behaviour, but also on the review of the international TP standards and on the exam of tax
regulation patterns across countries.
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Appendix
Table of TP Characteristics
Characteristics of TP systems Binary/
Numerical
variables
Number of
countries
presenting the
qualitative
characteristic
Mean value of
the numerical
variables
Implementation of TP system:
TP system is incorporated in domestic legislation. Binary 41
TP system follows the arm’s length principle. Binary 43
TP system overrides OECD TP Guidelines. Binary 12
Maturity (years) of TP system. Numerical 15.68
Related-party status:
The related-party status/interdependence: statutory
threshold.
Binary 31
The related-party status/interdependence: de facto
relationship.
Binary 44
The related-party status/interdependence: common
control.
Binary 42
TP system has specific provision on tax havens. Binary 16
TP system has specific provision for permanent
establishments (PE).
Binary 19
TP methods:
TP system adopts five conventional OECD methods. Binary 43
TP system adopts country-specific methods. Binary 5
TP system allows for alternative methods. Binary 16
Priority of methods: best for transaction. Binary 26
Priority of methods: traditional transaction methods. Binary 16
Priority of methods: specific domestic rule. Binary 6
Priority of methods: CUP. Binary 9
Foreign comparables are accepted by tax authorities. Binary 40
TP system accepts set-offs/bundled transactions. Binary 13
Provisions on internal services and cost-sharing agreements:
Management fees/head office expenses are
accepted/deductible by TP system/domestic legislation.
Binary 43
TP system/domestic legislation has specific
provision/requirements for management fees/head office
expenses.
Binary 19
TP system/domestic legislation levy withholding tax on
management fees/head office expenses.
Binary 22
Commissionaire arrangements are accepted/deductible by
TP system/domestic legislation.
Binary 40
Cost-sharing/cost-contribution arrangements (CSA/CCA)
are accepted/deductible by TP system/domestic
legislation.
Binary 40
17
TP system/domestic legislation has specific
provision/requirements for cost-sharing/cost-contribution
arrangements (CSA/CCA).
Binary 18
TP system/domestic legislation levy withholding tax on
cost-sharing/cost-contribution arrangement (CSA/CCA).
Binary 15
Disclosure of TP information:
TP system has specific statutory requirements for TP
documentation.
Binary 33
Maturity (years) of statutory requirements for TP
documentation.
Numerical 8.22
Disclosure of specific TP return/study is required. Binary 33
Deadline (months from year end) to prepare/disclose TP
return.
Numerical 5.28
Disclosure of specific TP return/study is conditioned/does
not apply for all taxpayers.
Binary 16
TP return/study includes at most general information on
intra-firm transactions (short disclosure).
Binary 17
TP return/study includes TP methods and/or calculation
(long disclosure).
Binary 16
TP system determine clear deadline for submission of full
TP documentation (when requested).
Binary 40
Deadline (months from year end) to provide full TP
documentation (when required)
Numerical 1.05
Statutes of limitations:
Statute of limitations (months) for general TP assessment. Numerical 65.00
TP system/domestic legislation has special statute of
limitation for intentional non-compliance.
Binary 23
Statute of limitations (months) for TP assessment in case
of intentional non-compliance
Numerical 93.40
TP penalizations:
TP system has specific TP penalizations. Binary 15
Maximum TP penalization (percentage of the unpaid tax)
for general tax adjustment
Numerical 0.82
Maximum TP penalization (percentage of the unpaid tax)
for tax adjustment due to high level of
negligence/fraud/intentional avoidance
Numerical 1.41
TP system has fixed TP penalty for failure in
documentation/info disclosure.
Binary 15
TP system has variable TP penalty for failure in
documentation/info disclosure.
Binary 16
TP system allows appeal for penalty relief/reduction. Binary 28
Advanced pricing agreements (APA)/APA-like provisions:
APA/APA-like options are avaliable. Binary 38
Possible roll-back application of APA/APA-like options. Binary 13
APA/APA-like options include unilateral agreement. Binary 35
APA/APA-like options include bilateral/multilateral
agreement.
Binary 36
Maximum APA/APA-like term of agreement (months) Numerical 53.82
18
Competent authority (CA) procedures:
CA procedures are effectivelly available. Binary 35
CA procedures are proposed (usually) after tax assessment. Binary 29
CA procedures may be proposed before/during tax
assessment.
Binary 7
Double tax relief is likely to occur via CA procedure. Binary 18
CA procedures prevent/suspend tax payment. Binary 21
CA procedures are rarely submitted/seek by taxpayers. Binary 25
19
